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Marriage Through the
Lens of Divorce
Mark Lis
To understand Superman, one must study kryptonite. Through understanding where a bridge
fails, engineers gain new insights into construction. So too, through understanding divorce, can we
illuminate the meaning and essence of Jewish marriage as understood in early Rabbinic sources. Within
Judaism, marriage is deeply central to personal and communal life, and one who never marries is
considered to not have fully lived. There is no one single reason why marriage is so highly valued, nor
is there a simple aspect that defines a marital relationship. Divorce, however, namely the failure of
marriage, touches upon the essence of marriage and why it is so highly esteemed.
To understand how divorce can be useful to understand marriage, it is important to first
provide some background on the laws of marriage and divorce within Judaism.

Marriage in Judaism

During the eras when the Mishna and Gemara came into being, Jews were part of societies
with significantly varied approaches to sex and sexuality. In the Hellenistic world the human body
itself was placed on a pedestal. Meanwhile, for most Early Christian groups, sex was viewed as
inherently sinful.1 After all, Jesus was the sole individual to be born without being conceived and
therefore to not be born of sin. The New Testament states, “When the dead rise, they will neither
marry nor be given in marriage; they will be like the angels in heaven.”2 This extract emphasizes the
this-worldly, and potentially impure, nature of sex even within marriage.
1

Yet, for traditional Jews, neither of these extremes has ever been viewed as valid.3 Jews have
consistently interpreted the Bible as intensely pro-marriage and not as pro-asceticism or pro-hedonism.
For instance: “Let your fountain be blessed and rejoice in the wife of your youth,”4 “He who has found
a wife has found good and obtains favor from God,”5 and “It is not good that the man should be alone;
I will make him a helper fit for him,”6 have all been cited as proof that marriage is the ideal, not a
capitulation. The Talmud records that marriage is proclaimed from heaven itself: “Forty days before
the formation of the fetus a Divine Voice emerges and states: The daughter of so-and-so shall be the
wife of so-and-so.”7,8 Marriage is clearly the will of God.
The Sages viewed marriage as a divine gift and saw this attitude all across scriptures:
Rav said in the name of Rabbi Reuven ben Itzterobili … the decree that a specific
woman is destined to be married to a specific man is from God. From where is this
derived? It is from the Torah, as it is written: ‘Then Laban and Bethuel answered and
said: The thing comes from the Lord, we cannot speak to you either bad or good’
(Genesis 24:50). From the Prophets, as it is written: ‘But his father and his mother
knew not that it was of the Lord’ (Judges 14:4). From the Writings, as it is written:
‘House and riches are the inheritance of fathers; but a prudent woman is from the
Lord’ (Proverbs 19:14).9
The wife is compared to the Temple - the Holy of Holies - and to light itself:
And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: ‘For any man whose first wife dies, it is as if the Temple
were destroyed in his days’… Rabbi Alexandri says: ‘For any man whose wife dies in
his days, the world is dark for him.’10
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Marriage’s societal impact is enormous, particularly its direct connection to bringing children
into the world. The first commandment mankind receives is to be fruitful, multiply and fill the earth,
pru urivu.11 Creating life is the highest form of imitatio Dei possible; it is the holiest and most divine
act one can do on Earth. Rashi, commenting on Beitza 36b, asserts that marriage is a positive
commandment, and that the commandment is synonymous with the commandment to have children.
Thus, Rashi claims that having children is the crux of marriage. The continuation of humankind and
of the Jewish people quite literally rests on procreation. The Talmud says that each soul is dear enough
for God to have created the world, and that one who saves a life has, in a sense, saved the whole
world.12,13 The Mishna also asserts that the world was created solely for the sake of reproduction,
supporting the belief that the creation of life has such a high status.14,15
Going further, the Talmud also says that even if having children is out of the question, one
should still get married:
The Gemara infers from the Mishna’s wording that if he already has children he may
neglect the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply, but he may not neglect the mitzva to
have a wife. This quote supports what Rav Naḥman said in the name of Shmuel: “Even
if a man has several children, it is prohibited to remain without a wife, as it is stated:
‘It is not good that the man should be alone’ (Genesis 2:18).”16
Marriage, therefore, is an ultimate purpose that would have value regardless of other potential
motivations. God has proclaimed that it is not good for man to be alone and that marriage is good
because of the intimate interpersonal connection it creates. Many kabbalists appreciate this view and
say that marriage is the reunion of two half souls forming one full soul, much like the reunion of the
aspects of God in kabbalistic theology. There is a metaphysical good done through this reunion
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achieved through marriage, and the world is in some sense repaired.17 Considering that the verses
quoted above from Tanakh do not mention children when discussing kindness and love within a
marriage, it seems that marriage is independently valuable. One midrash implies that mutual love and
understanding makes a marriage worthwhile even at the expense of potentially having no children.18
These images of marriage from a non-pragmatic vantage point often take on a metaphysical
nature. Namely, the nation of Israel’s relationship with God is often compared to that of a wife to her
husband because marriage is seen as a covenant and is ideally filled with compassion and dedication.
A marital covenant is in many ways the perfect parallel for the covenant between God and the nation
of Israel. Both covenants imply the existence of kinship and require fidelity; the natural state of each
is to exist for as long as both participants are alive.19
And I will judge thee, as women that break wedlock and shed blood are judged; and I
will bring upon thee the blood of fury and jealousy ... Nevertheless, I will remember
My covenant with thee in the days of thy youth, and I will establish unto thee an
everlasting covenant.20
Marriage is a contract involving exclusivity. Marriage is defined by prohibition to everyone else, thus
making it a unique bond; it is only between the partners and no one else is allowed to enter into or
abrogate their covenant. The connection between marriage and our relationship with God is so
prominent that when Jews put on tefillin in the mornings, they say:
And I will betroth thee unto Me forever; yea, I will betroth thee unto Me in
righteousness, and in justice, and in lovingkindness, and in compassion. And I will
betroth thee unto Me in faithfulness; and thou shalt know the Lord.21
There is a deep association between Marriage and faithfulness.22
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Divorce in Judaism

Divorce is often viewed as the direct betrayal of a covenant.23
Rabbi Eliezer says: Concerning anyone who divorces his first wife, even the Mizbeaḥ
(altar) sheds tears about him, as it is stated: ‘And further, this you should do: Cover
the altar of the Lord with tears, with weeping and sighing, from His no longer showing
regard to the offering, nor receiving it with goodwill from your hand’ (Mal. 2:13), and
it is written: ‘Yet you say: Why? Because the Lord has been witness between you and
the wife of your youth, against whom you have dealt treacherously, though she is your
companion and the wife of your covenant’ (Mal. 2:14).24
This baraita is the last word in tractate Gittin, the tractate that specifically deals with divorce. The
placing of this homiletical teaching as the final note on divorce is a powerful structural message about
the gravity of divorce, and the placement nicely complements the words of the baraita as a powerful
and strong condemnation of divorce. This attitude towards divorce is clearly cross-generational. Rabbi
Eliezer is a Tanna, a rabbi from the first centuries CE. Yet this story and its commentary is primarily
in Aramaic, the language in which centuries later the Amoraim and Savoraim wrote. Thus, Rabbi
Eliezer’s statement was made hundreds of years before this passage’s final form was written down by
other generations of rabbis who agreed with and added on to his statements.
One striking question is why the Mizbeaḥ, the altar, cries over divorce. Why not the Menorah,
or the laver or any other of the Temple’s vessels? Perry Netter, a Conservative Rabbi and author living
in Zikhron Yaakov, says the reason the Mizbeaḥ and not God Himself cries is because God is easy to
find in a healthy marriage but seemingly absent in divorces and unhealthy marriages. Rabbi Netter
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writes that He is not truly absent, but rather than God crying, His abode on Earth cries on His behalf.25
While a touching and insightful idea, the original question still stands: Why specifically the Mizbeaḥ?
To answer this question, Dr. Reuven Bulka, a Canadian Psychologist and Orthodox Rabbi,
writes the following:
These two fundamental emotions, penitence and appreciation, are evoked at the altar.
They are also two critical ingredients in marriage. Being penitent speaks of the ability
to see that one has erred, that one has not lived up to one’s responsibilities, and that
one has the courage and the desire to correct the situation. Being appreciative is an
essential part of the outer-directedness dynamic of marriage. Expressing appreciation
to one’s spouse binds the relationship with the glue of caring and attentiveness.
Marriages that fail invariably lack the outer-directedness and ‘willingness to adjust’
ingredients. The altar, which also thrives on these ingredients, cries when a couple
divorce, when the ingredients it thrives on are lacking in marriage.26
The Mizbeaḥ is crying not because of divorce itself, but because of the situation that has caused
the divorce to become necessary. This interpretation minimizes the harsh stance against divorce that
this baraita had initially taken. The action of divorce, when necessary, does not make the Mizbeaḥ
cry. The fact that divorce is necessary makes it cry.
A similar concept can be seen in some medieval commentaries. For instance, the Metzudat
David says that the altar’s cries mimic the cries of the women of Israel who cry over their insults and
scorn.27 Rashi when discussing this dictum also says something similar, but focuses on the husbands
at the time treating their Jewish wives as if they were concubines and courting non-Jewish women
despite already being married. For the pain of Jewish women, the Mizbeaḥ cries. Thus, if the divorce
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did not happen in any of these senses, the Mizbeaḥ would still be crying. Divorce, it would seem, is
sometimes kosher. 28

Divorce and Marriage Together

Despite being a foundational construct of society and the basis of the Jewish community, the
marriage process itself is hardly discussed in Tanakh. Ironically, verses about divorce are actually the
foundation for most of the laws pertaining to the institution and rites of marriage in Judaism29: “When
a man takes a wife and possesses her, if she does not find favor in his eyes because he finds something
flawed about her (Ervat davar), and he writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to her, and sends her
away from his house.”30
This verse contributes substantially to Rabbinic understanding of when divorce is considered
permissible.31 Some may expect the question of when divorce is allowed or warranted to be discussed
on the first page of the tractate, but divorce’s permissibility is only discussed in the last Mishna of the
only tractate whose primary focus is divorce. The details of when and why divorce is an acceptable
practice are surprisingly sparse and much less fleshed out than are the details of how one may hand
the writ of divorce to his wife. The fact that the Rabbis were so taciturn on this topic reflects two
fundamental realities. First, the Talmud is chiefly a legalistic work. While it does deal with theology,
ethics, science, medicine, and history, these are secondary to the legalistic discussions and exegetical
analyses of the Talmud. Second, the Rabbis were wary of explaining exactly when divorce is warranted.
Any human relationship is inherently complicated and multifaceted, and understanding all the
specifics associated with them is nearly impossible for an outsider. No one can create a set of external
rules that govern all marriages, and no one can truly understand a marriage in which they are not one
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of the parties. The Rabbis, who were so in favor of debate and who so valued uncertainty, realized that
trying to legislate when one should or should not get divorced would be in many ways a fool’s errand
with potentially disastrous results.
While they did not discuss how to know when one should get divorced, they did discuss when
one is allowed to get divorced:32
Beit Shammai say: A man may not divorce his wife unless he finds out about her having
engaged in a matter of forbidden sexual intercourse [devar erva], i.e., she committed
adultery or is suspected of doing so, as it is stated: ‘Because he has found some
unseemly matter [ervat davar] in her, and he writes her a scroll of severance’
(Deuteronomy 24:1). And Beit Hillel say: He may divorce her even due to a minor
issue, e.g., because she burned or over-salted his dish, as it is stated: ‘Because he has
found some unseemly matter in her,’ meaning that he found any type of shortcoming
in her. Rabbi Akiva says: He may divorce her even if he found another woman who is
better looking than her and wishes to marry her, as it is stated in that verse: ‘And it
comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes’ (Deuteronomy 24:1).33
The positions of Rabbi Akiva and Beit Hillel seem quite shallow. Is burning dinner in any
sense a reason to get divorced? Would any marriage be able to survive if a burned soup could end it?
The Meiri, a 13th century Catalonian Talmudic scholar, expounds upon this debate and says that, yes,
burning dinner can be a good reason to get divorced. He explains that the inability for a family to be
sturdy enough to feed itself shows that the household is dysfunctional.34 According to the Meiri, then,
Beit Hillel actually held marriage to a higher standard than did Beit Shammai. A marriage is not
successful if neither partner simply refrains from violating the bare minimum precept of physical
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fidelity. For a marriage to be considered successful overall, it must also be coherent and functional.
Rabbi Akiva follows with higher standards, saying that if a man finds any woman more attractive than
his wife, he has enough cause to divorce her. Even if both partners are physically faithful, and even if
the house is functional, a marriage is not necessarily complete. Rabbi Akiva would likely say that a
marriage should be more than a good working relationship as seen between two business partners. A
marriage must include love, attraction, and care; if these aspects are lacking, there are grounds for the
marriage’s dissolution.
Divorce does not serve solely to teach the inherently complex nature of private relationships
or what the intimate relationship of marriage must minimally include to be considered successful.
Divorce also serves to teach about the institutional nature of marriage. It is written:
A woman is acquired by [i.e., becomes betrothed to,] a man to be his wife in three
ways, and she acquires herself [i.e., she terminates her marriage,] in two ways. The
Mishna elaborates: She is acquired through money, through a document, and through
sexual intercourse … And a woman acquires herself through a bill of divorce or
through the death of the husband.35
The three methods of betrothal seem to be unrelated either to each other or to the nature of
marriage. They seem to be three different legal alternatives through which marriage can be affected.
However, the relevance of these three methods of betrothal to marriage itself becomes clear through
divorce. Divorce is created through the negation of marriage and requires the completion of three
separate acts which parallel the three possible methods of betrothal.
From the verse, “When a man takes a wife and possesses her, if she does not find favor in his
eyes because he finds something flawed about her, and he writes her a bill of divorcement, hands it to

9

her, and sends her away from his house,”36 the Rabbis learn that a man must produce a physically
written contract, hand it to his soon-to-be ex-wife, and then live separately from her. The physical
contract to dissolve a marriage parallels the contract to enter marriage, the giving of divorce contract
mirrors the giving of money to enter a marriage and sending her away mirrors the physical intimacy
that can begin a marriage.
Marriage is a multifaceted institution. There is a contractual societal obligation that a marriage
contract or divorce contract symbolize. The husband and wife have certain obligations toward each
other, much like business partners. This aspect of marriage is represented by the contract as a betrothal
method. Additionally, the wife and husband are not fully independent when married to each other, as
symbolized by the acquisition the man takes of the women through payment, and how she takes back
full ownership of herself when she is physically given the contract of divorce.37 There is an aspect of
ownership over one’s spouse in marriage.38 Lastly, there is the practical relationship aspect to marriage.
Part of marriage is living together and being together intimately, and a part of the dissolution of
marriage is the negation of this relationship. Therefore, it is considered crucial in the Talmud to say
to the women, “behold you are free and permitted to anyone” for a divorce to take effect. Being
forbidden to someone else on account of one’s relationship with a specific man is definitionally
marriage, and divorce is inherently incompatible with maintaining the special exclusivity that comes
with marriage.39
Marriage is central to the Jewish conception of the world. It is a model for interacting with
God as well as the institution through which Jews are prescribed to organize their lives. Jewish marriage
is neither a capitulation to baser needs nor solely a pragmatic issue, though there are pragmatic aspects
to it. Through an analysis of divorce, we have seen how important marriage in Judaism is. Divorce can
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be the greatest betrayal and ultimate selfishness, but it is sometimes necessary. The Rabbis did not
dictate when exactly divorce is warranted and when a marriage is worth preserving because marriage
depends on the attention and emotions of those in the marriage. An outsider cannot accurately
understand the situation, and no set of rules could sufficiently establish a precedent that is universally
applicable. The delimitation as to when divorce is permissible, however, sheds light on what the bare
minimum is for a marriage to be considered passable and as the Rabbis are often wont to do, they
debate it. Furthermore, since divorce is the negation of marriage, we can learn about marriage by
analyzing the steps taken in divorce and applying them in reverse. By studying where marriage fails,
we can truly gain a deeper understanding of when and how marriage thrives.

Mark Lis is a Senior from Skokie, IL majoring in Biology and NELC.
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